Jio Platforms IPO: lists scale at a premium price — growth is real, but pricing power still trails Bharti

1. IPO Overview

Jio Platforms is raising about Rs 28,755 crore to Rs 30,213 crore at Rs 1,065 to Rs 1,119 a share, entirely through new shares. The money will mainly prepay debt inside its telecom arm, Reliance Jio Infocomm.

The one thing to notice is scale. At the top of the band, Rs 1,119 a share, the company is valued at about Rs 10.3 lakh crore on post-issue shares, which would make it one of India's largest listings. There is no offer for sale, so no existing shareholder is selling and all proceeds, net of expenses, stay with the company.

Basis: market cap and P/E on post-issue shares; P/E uses profit attributable to owners for the year ended March 31, 2026.

2. What the company does

Jio Platforms is the holding company for Reliance's telecom and digital businesses. Its main asset is Reliance Jio Infocomm, which runs a pan-India mobile network, plus fast-growing home broadband, enterprise connectivity and a stack of digital apps and platforms.

In plain words, it sells connectivity by the month and then tries to sell more on top of the pipe.

Sells connectivity plans to more than half a billion users

Mobile prepaid is the core. Customers choose plans with varied validity periods, including 28 and 84 days; these are examples, not the bounds of every recharge cycle. Reliance Retail acts as the sole prepaid distributor. The company also sells postpaid, fixed broadband over fibre and fixed wireless, leased lines to businesses, and devices such as phones and home gateways. Sources: Jio prepaid plans and RHP p.33.

Scale is the story. The base stood at about 52.40 crore customers at the end of March 2026 and about 53.30 crore three months later. Net additions were lumpy, with a slow year followed by a strong rebound, while monthly churn stayed low.

The table shows two drivers working together. Volumes recovered sharply in FY26, while average revenue per user rose steadily after an industry-wide tariff increase in the second quarter of FY25, plus a richer mix of 5G and home users and heavier data use.

Data traffic is growing; peer comparisons use different customer mixes

Jio's network carries very heavy traffic. Data volumes rose from about 14,900 crore GBs to about 24,100 crore GBs in two years, and monthly use per customer reached about 42 GB. These figures cover RJIL's total customer base, including mobile and fixed broadband. Bharti's separately reported India mobile usage and ARPU cover a different customer mix, so the two sets should not be read as a like-for-like measure of pricing power (RHP pp.132, 189).

RJIL's reported monthly churn was about 1.7% in the FY26 exit quarter. Its reported rate is lower than the Bharti India mobile and Vodafone Idea figures in the peer table, although the customer populations differ. Low churn supports customer retention, but a blended-versus-mobile comparison does not by itself establish a superior pricing strategy (RHP pp.132, 190).

Home broadband is now the second growth engine

Fixed broadband has scaled quickly, from about 1.10 crore to about 2.70 crore customers in two years, and to about 2.90 crore by June 2026. Jio captured 61.73% of market-wide net fixed-broadband customer additions in the quarter ended June 2026; this is a market share of fixed-broadband additions, not the contribution of homes to Jio’s own total additions (RHP p.215). The push rests on two products:

• fibre to the home in cities and towns;
• JioAirFiber, a plug-and-play fixed-wireless box that needs no last-mile fibre and has reached about 1.40 crore premises.

The 5G base, at about 28.50 crore, supports both. Standalone 5G carries the mobile load and also backhauls AirFiber traffic, so the same towers and spectrum feed phones and homes.

Almost all sales and profit still come from one subsidiary

Reliance Jio Infocomm dominates the group. It accounted for about 88% of consolidated revenue and over 93% of EBITDA and profit in FY26, with a similar share in the June quarter. The listed parent also earns platform, device and other digital revenue, which has more than doubled in two years but remains small.

Recharge vouchers sold to Reliance Retail are initially accounted for as advances against services, then as deferred revenue when sold onward to customers, and recognised as service revenue according to the tariff plan. Annual advance-receipt transactions with Reliance Retail rose from about Rs 89,100 crore in FY24 to about Rs 112,900 crore in FY26. Those figures measure transactions during each year; they are not the outstanding advance balance or cash retained at year end. The arrangement supports upfront collection, but its working-capital benefit requires analysis of balances and timing (RHP pp.32, 387).

What decides growth from here is straightforward:

1. whether tariff repair continues and revenue per customer improves on a consistent basis;
2. whether home additions stay strong without heavy subsidies;
3. whether the 5G network built at high cost now sweats harder with little extra spend.

3. Use of Funds

There is no offer for sale. All new-share proceeds, after issue expenses, go to the company.

• Prepay about Rs 27,500 crore of external commercial borrowings and term loans at Reliance Jio Infocomm, out of about Rs 29,917.10 crore of identified loans.
• Balance for general corporate purposes.

The prepayment directly lowers debt at the operating company that generates almost all profit, rather than at the holding company.

4. Financials Overview

Revenue and operating profit grew every year, margins edged up, and leverage fell as the heavy 5G build wound down. The latest quarter is a three-month stub and is not comparable to full years.

Three-month stub ended June 30, 2026. Quarterly net leverage uses non-annualised EBITDA and is not directly comparable with annual ratios (RHP p.451).

The trend is rising scale with stable profitability and a much lighter balance sheet by FY26. The detail behind that shift matters more than the headline growth.

5. What the financials tell us

The accounts describe a telecom builder turning into a telecom harvester. Heavy spending created the network, and now traffic and tariffs are filling it. Costs, accounting choices and group structure shape how much of that shows up as profit and cash.

Growth comes from both more users and higher bills, but in uneven bursts

Customer growth was not smooth. Net additions fell to about 60 lakh in FY25 and then rebounded to about 3.60 crore in FY26, while ARPU rose each year. The tariff increase in mid-FY25 lifted the whole industry, and Jio added 5G users and home users who pay more than a basic mobile recharge.

That mix matters for durability:

• tariff-led ARPU gains drop through quickly because the network already exists;
• volume-led gains cost more to serve at first, especially for homes that need a box, installation and service;
• low churn means past additions compound, so a weak year does not unwind the base.

The risk is that FY25 shows how sensitive volumes are to price. When tariffs rose, additions slowed. When promotions and AirFiber supply improved, they snapped back. Future ARPU rises will test the same trade-off.

The big build is largely done, and cash is now left over after capex

Cash capex fell from about Rs 53,500 crore to about Rs 34,200 crore over two years, and to about Rs 4,200 crore in the June quarter against about Rs 12,000 crore a year earlier. As a share of revenue, it dropped from close to half to under a quarter, and to about 11% in the stub quarter.

EBITDA less cash capex shows the change in spending intensity. It rose from about Rs 1,400 crore to about Rs 42,100 crore in two years. This leaves well over half of FY26 EBITDA after cash capex, before interest, deferred spectrum payments, tax and other cash-flow adjustments. It is a non-GAAP measure, not free cash flow: cash capex already includes spectrum expenditure within its definition, while deferred spectrum payments are disclosed separately (RHP pp.135, 452, 454).

This is normal for a network cycle ending, not a permanent saving. Maintenance capex, capacity adds and home devices will continue. But the peak 5G rollout that depressed free cash is behind, so cash generation should track operating profit more closely unless a new technology cycle starts.

Financing charges and asset-life estimates affect reported profit

Two items sit between network performance and bottom line.

First, finance costs jumped to about Rs 8,700 crore in FY26 from about Rs 4,900 crore a year earlier, even as cash capex fell. That happened because 5G assets were capitalised and interest on them could no longer be added to asset cost. It moved from the balance sheet to the profit and loss account once the network went live.

Second, depreciation rose to about Rs 27,200 crore. Effective April 1, 2025, the company extended the useful life of certain network assets from 16 to 18 years. That change reduced FY26 depreciation and amortisation by Rs 1,840.5 crore and increased profit before the share of associate/JV results and tax by the same amount. Without the change, depreciation would have been higher and profit lower; the estimate change did not itself alter cash (RHP pp.48, 448).

For a retail reader, operating performance and accounting effects need to be separated. Expensing interest after assets enter service weighed on reported profit, while extending asset lives supported it through lower depreciation. EBITDA less cash capex improved as spending fell, but that measure does not capture every cash-flow item.

Home growth lifts revenue but brings new costs to watch

Fixed broadband added about 1.60 crore customers in two years. That scale required boxes in homes, more rented sites and fibre, plus content to sell bundles.

Two cost lines were linked to broadband and content expansion:

• rent, including low-value customer-premises equipment, rose from about Rs 130.00 crore to about Rs 3,900 crore;
• content charges rose from about Rs 360.00 crore to about Rs 1,700 crore.

Separately, subscription fees rose from about Rs 970.00 crore to about Rs 1,850.00 crore, primarily because of fees paid to third-party cloud service providers. This line should not be attributed to home-broadband growth without further evidence (RHP pp.448, 450).

Group EBITDA margin still rose to about 52% and to about 53% in the June stub. That shows the group absorbed these costs overall, but does not isolate the profitability of the home business. Device subsidies, service visits and content deals remain watchpoints as AirFiber expands into smaller towns.

The group is effectively one telecom company plus a distribution link

Dependence is high on two related parties. Reliance Jio Infocomm drives almost all revenue and profit, and Reliance Retail handles close to four-fifths of revenue as sole prepaid distributor. The prepaid model collects cash ahead of service delivery; the annual advance-receipt transaction amount does not measure how much funding remains available at any one date.

That structure has two effects:

• minority leakage is small, because non-controlling interest is tiny against total equity;
• operational risk concentrates on distribution and collection. Any disruption at the distributor or change in commission would hit cash first.

The IPO use of proceeds directly addresses the other side, leverage. Total borrowings stood at about Rs 61,400 crore at the end of June, while net debt after cash and marketable securities was only about Rs 9,500 crore. Reported net leverage was 0.36 times for FY26 and 0.46 times for Q1 FY27, but the latter uses non-annualised quarterly EBITDA. The figures do not show a like-for-like increase in leverage. Net debt actually fell from Rs 27,579.2 crore at March 2026 to Rs 9,539.1 crore at June 2026 (RHP p.451). Prepaying about Rs 27,500 crore of operating-company loans would cut interest and refinancing risk further.

A full picture needs two liabilities that net debt excludes. Deferred spectrum dues to the telecom department were about Rs 104,500 crore and lease liabilities about Rs 12,200 crore. They do not sit in borrowings, but they are real future cash calls. Leverage looks clean on bank debt and light on spectrum dues only if operating cash keeps growing.

6. Valuation Analysis

At the top of the band, the IPO values Jio Platforms at about 34 times its FY26 profit on post-issue shares. The RHP also discloses Bharti Airtel at 40.71 times and Vodafone Idea at 3.99 times, using October 13, 2026 closing prices and FY26 diluted EPS. These provide reference points, with differences in share basis, valuation date and earnings quality that limit a simple ranking (RHP pp.130–131).

The multiple requires confidence in sustained growth, cash conversion and returns on capital. Jio’s reported return on capital has weakened while Bharti’s has improved, but blended Jio ARPU versus Bharti mobile ARPU does not establish a like-for-like pricing-power gap. The investment case depends on better monetisation without losing customers and on profitable home expansion, rather than an assumed convergence between differently defined ARPU figures.

7. Peer Analysis

Basis: Jio uses post-issue shares and FY26 profit attributable to owners; peer ratios are the RHP’s disclosed dated market-price-to-diluted-EPS figures. These are reference comparisons with different share and price bases. Vodafone Idea’s exceptional gains also limit the usefulness of its reported P/E (RHP pp.130–131).

The only true peer is Bharti. Vodafone Idea is a distressed contrast, with shrinking users, negative operating earnings after depreciation and leverage near eight times, and its FY26 profit distorted by large exceptional gains. It cannot anchor valuation.

Jio recorded the fastest FY24-to-FY26 revenue growth among the displayed companies, at about 34%, and low reported churn. Those are strengths, while customer-mix differences qualify the retention comparison. Its reported net-debt measure is also narrower than peer measures, so it should not be used alone to rank balance-sheet risk.

Telecom value depends on monetisation and returns on the network. Bharti India mobile reported ARPU of about Rs 257 and monthly usage of about 31 GB, while Jio reported blended RJIL ARPU of about Rs 214 and usage of about 42 GB across its total customer base. The customer mixes differ, so these figures do not by themselves explain Bharti India’s roughly seven-percentage-point EBITDA margin lead. Return on capital did move in opposite directions over FY24–FY26, falling to about 11% for Jio while rising to about 19% for Bharti Consolidated (RHP pp.132, 189–191).

Peer figures above are transcribed in the offer document from peers' own exchange filings and reports. Peer net leverage is not directly comparable because peers include spectrum dues in net debt while Jio excludes them.

Jio’s scale and revenue growth are substantial, while Bharti’s reported returns on capital are stronger. A valuation judgment should compare consistent operating metrics and account for debt definitions, business mix and earnings quality. The disclosed P/Es do not show Jio trading at a premium to Bharti on their respective stated bases, and differently defined ARPU figures should not be treated as a direct convergence target.

8. Moat

What genuinely sets it apart

• Scale in network traffic. The network was built for data from day one, with pan-India 5G and a large fibre footprint. Carrying about 24,100 crore GBs lets fixed costs spread over huge traffic, which supports low prices without collapsing margins.
• Distribution and collection at scale. Reliance Retail’s sole prepaid distribution arrangement supports reach and upfront collection. Annual advance-receipt transactions exceeded Rs 110,000 crore in FY26; this is a flow of transactions, not a stock of cash available to fund the business. The breadth of the retail and payments network is the relevant distribution advantage (RHP pp.32–33, 387).
• Home product that avoids digging. AirFiber turns a tower into a home connection without laying last-mile fibre. That shortens rollout time and lowers upfront cost per home versus pure fibre, which is why home adds accelerated.

Table stakes, not moats, include a digital app bundle and enterprise offers. Every large operator now sells cloud, security and content with connectivity, so apps help retention but do not by themselves command higher prices.

Tailwinds that reach sales directly

• Data growth. Video, gaming and work-from-home keep pushing monthly use higher. More GBs do not automatically mean more rupees, but they push users to higher-tier plans and reduce downgrades.
• Tariff repair. The mid-FY25 industry increase lifted ARPU for all players without a lasting spike in churn for Jio. Further measured increases, if competition follows, would flow largely to profit because network costs are fixed.
• Home broadband penetration. Fibre and fixed-wireless still cover only a fraction of Indian homes. Each AirFiber addition adds a second revenue stream from the same tower and spectrum.
• Enterprise digitisation. Small firms buying connectivity plus cloud and security buy stickier, higher-margin bundles than a single SIM.

How durable the edge is

The edge is strong but not unassailable. Spectrum, towers and retail reach are hard to copy quickly, and low churn compounds. Yet three forces can wear it down. First, Jio’s volume lead does not guarantee profit leadership; Bharti has stronger reported returns on capital, while the different ARPU customer mixes limit direct pricing comparisons. Second, technology cycles return; today's 5G surplus becomes tomorrow's 6G capex. Third, home growth shifts cost from network to doorstep — boxes, service and content — where execution matters more than spectrum.

Scale and distribution support a potential cost and reach advantage. The reported blended-versus-mobile ARPU comparison does not establish the strength of a pricing moat. Durability depends on improving monetisation and returns while retaining customers.

9. Risks

Pricing and competition

• Tariff increases and customer growth remain in tension: additions slowed in FY25 around the tariff round. Jio’s blended ARPU and Bharti’s mobile-only ARPU are not directly comparable, so the headline gap does not quantify the scope for price increases. If rivals hold prices to gain share, Jio may have to trade off growth and margins.

Capital intensity and hidden leverage

• Bank leverage looks light, but spectrum dues and leases together exceed Rs 110,000 crore and sit outside net debt. They are payable over years to the government and landlords. Any slowdown in operating cash would make those fixed calls heavier. The IPO prepayment helps bank debt, not these dues.

Cost of scaling homes

• Rent and content costs rose alongside broadband and content expansion. Subscription fees also increased, primarily because of third-party cloud costs, and should be assessed separately. Group margin improvement does not establish home-level returns; device costs, service and richer content bundles remain risks to the economics of expansion (RHP pp.448, 450).

Regulation and technology

• Telecom faces spectrum pricing, licence fees, quality rules and data norms. A shift in dues, penalties or rollout obligations can move cash more than profit. Future technology upgrades would restart capex just as the 5G cycle ends. These are industry-wide and persistent.

10. Verdict

The call rests on scale and revenue growth, a sharp improvement in EBITDA less cash capex as rollout spending fell, and weaker reported returns on capital despite lower borrowings. The peer comparison needs care: Jio’s blended ARPU and usage are not directly comparable with Bharti mobile-only metrics, and reported leverage definitions also differ.

Those facts describe a large volume grower whose investment case still depends on execution. At about 34 times FY26 profit, sustained improvement in monetisation, home economics and returns on capital matters. The thesis would weaken if tariff gains stall, churn rises, or home and content costs outrun the revenue they generate. The useful-life change that supported FY26 reported profit should also be distinguished from operating improvement.

For retail investors assessing telecom cycles, this is a scale-and-execution proposition. The question is whether future earnings and cash generation justify the IPO multiple, with spectrum and lease obligations included in the assessment. The case should rest on consistent operating comparisons and sustainable returns, rather than presumed ARPU convergence with a differently measured peer.

Source basis: supplied Jio Platforms RHP and desk price-band/capital-structure inputs. RHP citations use PDF page markers in the supplied source text. The additional Jio prepaid-plans page is linked above and should be attached in the desk before re-verification.